The “Benefits” of Non-Delegation: Using the Non-Delegation Doctrine to Bring More Rigor to Benefit–Cost Analysis

Abstract

This article posits that a more rigorous enforcement of the Constitutional Doctrine of Non-delegation would prevent many of the problems that have been identified with benefit–cost analysis. In particular, a rigorous application would prevent administrative agencies from using benefit–cost analysis as a screen to make policy decisions that the agency otherwise wishes to occur. Though the US Courts might have some difficulty in enforcing this notion, it is possible to do, and would greatly help the benefit–cost process, by regulating it to its proper place in an administrative system.

Citation

Flatt, V.B. (2007), "The “Benefits” of Non-Delegation: Using the Non-Delegation Doctrine to Bring More Rigor to Benefit–Cost Analysis", Zerbe, R.O. (Ed.) Research in Law and Economics (Research in Law and Economics, Vol. 23), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 49-66. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-5895(07)23002-7