Pollution and penalties

Abstract

This paper investigates the economic implications of applying different sanctions, notably criminal penalties, the suspension or revocation of licences and administrative fines to environmental regulatory contraventions. Using familiar economics of law enforcement models, we predict that the almost exclusive reliance by British environment agencies on criminal justice sanctions leads to under-deterrence. We argue that the agencies should be given powers to levy administrative financial charges from offenders without the procedures and onus of proof with which the criminal process protects defendants, but which also inhibits prosecution. The German system of Ordnungswidrigkeit provides an excellent model for this purpose.

Citation

Ogus, A. and Abbot, C. (2002), "Pollution and penalties", Swanson, T. (Ed.) An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Environmental Policy: Issues in Institutional Design (Research in Law and Economics, Vol. 20), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 493-516. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-5895(02)20023-8