TY  - CHAP
AB  - This paper examines binding multi-round commitments (MRCs) to the group account in a repeated voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) game. Before each five-round interval, subjects in a four-person group are given the option to commit a portion of their endowments to the group account for each of the next five rounds. Decision rounds proceed, with each subject's commitment acting as the binding minimum of his group-account allocation for each round. The opportunity to make MRCs does not increase mean allocations to the group account relative to a control treatment. However, commitments do have implications for reciprocal behavior within groups, leading to higher outcome variances across groups in the MRCs treatment.
VL  - 11
SN  - 978-0-76231-301-3, 978-1-84950-406-5/0193-2306
DO  - 10.1016/S0193-2306(06)11009-1
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-2306(06)11009-1
AU  - Halloran Matthew A.
AU  - Walker James M.
AU  - Williams Arlington W.
ED  - R. Mark Isaac
ED  - Douglas D. Davis
PY  - 2006
Y1  - 2006/01/01
TI  - The voluntary provision of a public good with binding multi-round commitments
T2  - Experiments Investigating Fundraising and Charitable Contributors
T3  - Research in Experimental Economics
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 225
EP  - 246
Y2  - 2024/09/20
ER  -