TY  - CHAP
AB  - Using analytical and experimental methods, this paper examines the extent to which targeted self-funding lotteries described by Morgan ((2000). Review of Economic Studies, 67(234), 761–784) improve social welfare in an environment with multiple public goods. Social welfare improves relative to the Nash prediction, when a single lottery is used to support provision of any socially desirable public good. However, social welfare is maximized if the lottery funds only the most socially desirable public good. Experimental results show that a lottery can fund a less socially desirable public good, but that efficiency declines as lottery ticket purchases crowd out voluntary contributions made in the absence of lotteries.
VL  - 11
SN  - 978-0-76231-301-3, 978-1-84950-406-5/0193-2306
DO  - 10.1016/S0193-2306(06)11005-4
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-2306(06)11005-4
AU  - Moir Robert
ED  - R. Mark Isaac
ED  - Douglas D. Davis
PY  - 2006
Y1  - 2006/01/01
TI  - Multiple Public Goods and Lottery Fund Raising
T2  - Experiments Investigating Fundraising and Charitable Contributors
T3  - Research in Experimental Economics
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 121
EP  - 142
Y2  - 2024/04/23
ER  -