TY  - CHAP
AB  - Charitable lotteries represent one of today's most popular fund-raising schemes. This study begins by developing theory examining the optimal design of a charitable lottery. We show that any prize distribution is only optimal for a group of n symmetric agents with given risk preference. However, there exist multiple prize distributions that generate contributions approaching the optimal level over a range of individual risk posture. We test our theory using a battery of experimental treatments. Our results suggest that lotteries dominate the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) in terms of total dollars raised. Moreover, the performance of lotteries weakly depends on individual risk preference.
VL  - 11
SN  - 978-0-76231-301-3, 978-1-84950-406-5/0193-2306
DO  - 10.1016/S0193-2306(06)11004-2
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-2306(06)11004-2
AU  - Lange Andreas
AU  - List John A.
AU  - Price Michael K.
AU  - Price Shannon M.
ED  - R. Mark Isaac
ED  - Douglas D. Davis
PY  - 2006
Y1  - 2006/01/01
TI  - The Optimal Design of Charitable Lotteries: Theory and Experimental Evidence
T2  - Experiments Investigating Fundraising and Charitable Contributors
T3  - Research in Experimental Economics
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 93
EP  - 119
Y2  - 2024/04/25
ER  -