BARGAINING BEHAVIOR, DEMOGRAPHICS AND NATIONALITY: WHAT CAN THE EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE SHOW?

Abstract

Field experiments have raised important issues of interpretation of bargaining behavior. There is evidence that bargaining behavior appears to vary across groups of populations, such as nationality, ethnicity and sex. Differences have been observed with respect to initial behavior and with respect to the adjustment pattern over time. Often, such behavioral differences are referred to as cultural, although the delineation of the cultural group has been confined to one or other observable characteristic in isolation. We show that this way of characterizing cultural differences is overly simplistic: at best, it leads to unreliable claims; at worst, it leads to erroneous conclusions. We reconsider the evidence provided by previous experiments using ultimatum game rules, and undertake new experiments that expand the controls for demographics. The lesson from our demonstration is that the task of designing experiments for the field offers many challenges if one wants to define and control for cultural impacts, but that field experiments also offer potential for providing new insights into these issues.

Citation

Botelho, A., Harrison, G.W., Hirsch, M.A. and Rutström, E.E. (2005), "BARGAINING BEHAVIOR, DEMOGRAPHICS AND NATIONALITY: WHAT CAN THE EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE SHOW?", Harrison, G.W., Carpenter, J. and List, J.A. (Ed.) Field Experiments in Economics (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 10), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 337-372. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-2306(04)10009-4