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John McGee's 1958 paper, “Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ) Case,” has had an astonishing influence on both antitrust policy in the United States and economic lore. McGee argued that predatory pricing is irrational and his analysis of the Standard Oil Company Matter, decided in 1911, led him to conclude that the Record in this case does not show that Standard Oil engaged in predatory pricing. This single publication appears to serve as a foundation of the U.S. Supreme Court's position on the issue of predatory pricing, as well as the assertion by many economists that predatory pricing is irrational and rarely occurs.

Numerous arguments have been advanced during the past 25 years that predatory pricing can be a rational strategy. As to McGee's empirical findings, there has been no re-examination of the Record of the Standard Oil case to determine the validity of his finding that the trial “Record” does not support the claim that Standard Oil engaged in predatory pricing.

We examined this Record and have found that the trial Record contains considerable evidence of predatory pricing by Standard Oil. Therefore, the Record does not support McGee's conclusion that Standard Oil did not engage in predatory pricing.

Thus, the decisions of the Supreme Court in recent years, as well as the opinions of many economists, concerning predatory pricing are not consistent with either current theory or the empirical record.

The authors provide an example of a group of online shoppers exploiting a pricing mistake and exploring the drivers of predatory shopping that may harm online retailers. This paper aims to examine the role of social vigilantism, proactivity and self-presentation in driving individual predatory shopping behaviors and delivers a broader understanding of how these behaviors develop in online communities.

The authors use a mixed-methods sequential research model. In Study 1, the authors explore predatory shopping by using a netnographic textual approach to analyze an online forum engaging in predatory shopping. In Study 2, the authors empirically analyze the uncovered conceptual findings using the PROCESS macro.

Customers who engage in predatory shopping online exhibit social vigilantism when communicating their views to others and proactively seeking out pricing mistakes and opportunities. Customers engaging in predatory shopping adapt their presentation online to increase their chances of success; this effect is strengthened by the online disinhibition effect.

Predatory shoppers can actively seek out pricing mistakes online, encourage participation and exploit mistakes by adapting their self-presentation. Therefore, online retailers should be proactive and consistent when communicating with customers and collaborating to deter predatory shopping. In addition, online retailers should focus on building advocates in communities to prevent harm from predatory shoppers online.

Online predatory shopping is explored qualitatively and quantitatively to understand the propensities that can drive predatory behavior and provide warning signs for online retailers. In addition, the effects of predatory shopping drivers are analyzed in the presence of the online disinhibition effect.

Current antitrust doctrine seemingly accepts average variable cost as one possible boundary between competitive and predatory pricing. Certain authors contend, however, that equally efficient rivals can sometimes be excluded from a market even when a dominant firm prices above its own average variable cost. A model is developed to test for predatory conduct in one such case. This model is applied to the reconstituted lemon juice industry. It shows that under certain conditions, even prices above average variable cost can be exclusionary.

The lens used by the courts and much of the antitrust literature on predatory selling and/or buying is based on partial equilibrium methodology. We demonstrate that such methodology is unreliable for assessments of predatory monopoly or monopsony conduct. In contrast to the typical two-stage dynamic analysis involving a predation period followed by a recoupment period, we advance a general equilibrium analysis that demonstrates the critical role of related industries and markets. Substitutability versus complementarity of both inputs and outputs is critical. With either monopolistic or monopsonistic market power (but not both), neither predatory overselling nor predatory overbuying is profitably sustainable. Two-stage predation/recoupment is profitable only with irreversibility in production and cost functions, unlike typical estimated forms from the production economic literature. However, when the market structure admits both monopolistic and monopsonistic behavior, predatory overbuying can be profitably sustainable while overselling cannot. Useful distinctions are drawn between contract versus non-contract markets for input markets.

The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.

This paper presents evidence to suggest that despite obstacles that made predatory pricing essentially impossible, the National Cash Register Co. (N.C.R.) managed successfully to deploy an arsenal of non-price predatory strategies that permitted it to consolidate and maintain a nearly complete monopoly of the cash-register trade. N.C.R. took actions to raise the costs and reduce the revenues of its rivals, actions that made sense only to the extent that N.C.R. could recoup their costs through the maintenance of monopoly rents. Our analysis suggests that antitrust prosecution was a significant threat to N.C.R., and ultimately forced the company to agree to abandon its most objectionable practices.

Marketing, Pricing, Strategic marketing.

The case is developed for an MBA-level program.

In May 2017, the telecom industry in India witnessed an intense price war over 4G (fourth generation) data prices. Gopal Vittal, CEO of Bharti Airtel was exploring various options on how best to respond to the situation. He had to take a final call regarding Bharti Airtel’s marketing team’s counter move to tackle this price war by Jio – should Bharti Airtel ignore it, accommodate it or retaliate with even lower prices? Bharti Airtel strongly believed that Jio pricing structure had violated “fair pricing” norms, and its pricing was anti-competitive. It had filed a case with the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to restrain Jio from further giving “free” promotional offers and penalize it for it. Could the legal recourse by Bharti Airtel dampen Jio’s consistent subscriber growth rate?

The case provides the students with an insight into how the competition focused on pricing happens in the telecom industry. The pricing war affects the profit margin of all competing companies. It changes the customer reference point for evaluating the competing products and services. The students would also learn practical applications of positive-sum pricing, pricing war, fair pricing and legal aspects of pricing. This case provides the students with an opportunity to understand the pricing war and how to respond to it in a particular situation; understand positive-sum pricing and negative-sum pricing in telecom industry context; understand legal aspects of pricing; and how to leverage data for gaining newer customer insights.

Teaching Notes are available for educators only. Please contact your library to gain login details or email support@emeraldinsight.com to request teaching notes.

CSS 8: Marketing.

This paper aims to examine the equilibrium limit price charged by a producer trying to deter the entry of a firm that can choose one of the two markets of complementary goods.

The authors model a dynamic game of incomplete information solved using a “perfect Bayesian equilibrium” approach.

It is shown that an incumbent will be willing to spend more resources – i.e. charge a lower limit price – to deter entry into its market as products become more complementary. This is because additional benefits are gained from entry deterrence by facing a more competitive market in the complementary product. The additional benefits of entry deterrence are shown to be a function of the degree of complementarity between goods.

A managerial implication of this article is that firms are willing to compete more fiercely to send an entrant to the other's incumbent market as the degree of complementarity between goods increases. An interesting conclusion that is derived from the above analysis is that managers should invest to understand the interdependences (e.g. complementarities) of the goods they sell, since the strategic variables chosen to compete may be affected by them, in some cases in a non‐trivial way.

From a public policy perspective, the main contribution of this paper is to point out that regulators who analyze predatory pricing, or other (probably) illegal “low‐price strategies”, should consider the degree of complementarity between goods and its effect on pricing.

As far as the authors' knowledge goes, there are no other papers that analyze entry decisions involving multiple markets of complementary goods.

This paper aims to study the historical origins of margin squeeze cases in the USA and Europe.

The author compares and contrasts major margin squeeze investigations in the USA and the European Union (EU) in terms of the role of efficiency and fairness and shows their roots in the socialist calculation debate of the 1940s.

It was found that the USA and EU diverge in their approaches towards margin squeeze claims. While the USA case law focuses more on efficiency, the European Commission makes decisions based more on fairness and “protection of rivals”. This shows that political and ideological preferences influence legal decision-making.

The paper is limited to major cases in telecommunications. It leaves aside cases in other areas. Thus, the author cautions that the generalization of the findings of the paper to all margin squeeze cases, or competition policy in general, may be difficult.

While there is extensive literature on margin squeeze cases in the USA and EU, there is little work on the historical and ideological connections. The paper contributes to the literature by drawing attention to political influences over technical decisions.