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In the construction industry, an under researched area of study is how main contractor (MC) sub-contract design responsibilities to sub-contractor (SC). This lack of knowledge is particularly serious in the context of delivery methods such as design and construct where design responsibilities are pushed down the supply chain. In this study, it is aimed to explore which level of design responsibility MCs sub-contract to SCs, for what reasons, and what the impact of sub-contracting decisions is on projects.

A qualitative in-depth multiple case study was conducted. Six sub-contracting cases were examined in two civil engineering projects. In each project, the MCs sub-contracted pre-fabricated beams, reinforcement and railing to SCs. Data collection included document analysis and interviews. A within-case and cross-case analysis was conducted to examine emerging empirical patterns. These patterns were used to elaborate theory and develop propositions.

MCs sub-contracted design responsibilities to SCs as suggested by literature. However, despite that sub-contracting was in keeping with literature, several problems were reported in the cases where MCs involved SCs no earlier than in the construction stage. This is not to be expected according to theory.

This study adds value to the sub-contracting field as it provides new insights in relationships between the level of design responsibilities sub-contracted and the impact of that on projects. The study also revealed new factors such as building information modelling (BIM) interoperability that should get more attention in sub-contracting.

This study provides a framework for comparing construction management contracts in the UK and the US construction practices. It starts by reviewing previous studies on UK and US contracting practices and explores the main delivery methods, inform of comparison with construction management contracting systems. It examines construction management contracting types, processes and procedures and interaction between the construction manager and other stakeholders. This study was based on a literature review and the result shows the similarities and differences between the American and British CM systems within each practice and between both practices; the distribution of responsibilities and risks both in pre‐construction and during the construction stages; and allocation of responsibility in both practices.

The performance of service supply chains in terms of service levels and cost efficiency depends not only on the effort of service providers but also on the inputs of sub-contractors and the customer. In this sense, performance-based contracting (PBC) entails increased financial risk for providers. Allocating and managing risk through contractual relationships along the service supply chain is a critical issue, and yet there is scant empirical evidence regarding what factors influence, and how, provider willingness to bear PBC-induced risk. This paper aims to address this gap.

The paper draws on agency theory and two cases of logistics service supply chains, in the food retail and automotive industries respectively, to identify key influencing factors. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with 30 managers of providers and sub-contractors and review of 35 documents, notably contracts and target letters.

Four influencing factors were found: performance attributability within the service supply chain; relational governance in service supply chain relationships; provider risk and reward balancing; and provider ability to transfer risk to sub-contractors. The propositions developed address how these factors influence provider willingness to bear PBC-induced risk.

The factors identified are external to the provider mindset and refer to the management of contractual relationships and service delivery interactions along the service supply chain. The paper contributes to agency theory by stressing the risk allocation implications of bi-directional principal-agent relations in service supply chains.

The study suggests ways in which providers can increase their capacity to bear and manage financial risk related to PBC design.

The paper identifies factors that influence provider willingness to bear financial risk induced by PBC in service supply chains.

Adversarial contracting methods are used for most public infrastructure procurement and timely delivery on budget remains a problem. In the past 20 years, OECD countries have adopted a number of alternative procurement methods that are based on collaborative principles including public private partnerships, long-term outsourcing arrangements and relationship/alliance contracts. We review the theoretical principles that operate for both adversarial and collaborative contracting methods. We identify the characteristics of non-adversarial contracting methods such as the output specification, qualitative selection criteria, the alignment of incentives, discrete allocation of residual control rights, life cycle costing, and risk-weighted value for money measurement that are delivering better procurement outcomes for government.

Focuses on the contract process as a source of information for managers seeking to contract more effectively. Draws on the findings of a multiple‐case comparative study undertaken to understand service‐contracting processes and the factors that influence them. Offers specific ideas for ways to manage contracting processes more effectively. Includes case examples to clarify the points raised.

The purpose of this paper is to examine different categories of building project procurement routes based on organisational, contractual, financial and technical issues.

The paper is based on review of literature and conditions of contracts. The UK construction industry serves as a general frame of reference. The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors survey of Contracts in Use from 1985 to 2004 is used to probe the share and value of contracts along different procurement routes and across different conditions of contracts in the UK. The logic is that the value and the share of contracts will indicate the behaviour of different procurement routes in the UK construction market while the in‐depth analysis of conditions of contracts will show the gaps and relationships between the general definition/categorisation and contractual context (conditions of contracts) of each of the procurement routes.

The preliminary result of the analysis shows that traditional routes remain the main type of procurement route for the construction project industry sector, within which different management and incentivisation systems are applied for greater efficiency. The conditions of contracts in the UK support this assertion by aligning different procurement routes to different conditions of contracts and additionally specifying different forms of agreements, special provisions and incentivisation in order to increase performance, reduce risks and improve compensation methods.

The study can serve as a learning opportunity for construction project stakeholders internationally, and clients in particular, to differentiate between procurement routes, management‐oriented systems, relational contracting and incentivisation.

The research provides an original assessment of construction procurement which can be used as intervening tool in different levels of private and public procurement strategies.

The purpose of this paper is to present a novel version of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm of internationalisation (OLI framework) to explain both inbound and outbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in multinational contracting.

The OLI factors and hypothesis are significantly developed to address a weakness in the OLI framework in its application to settings, such as multinational contracting, with extreme heterogeneity arising from extreme location specificity.

These developments advance Dunning’s seminal contribution and bring this to life in construction research that has barely applied the framework and, when doing so, has focused only on outbound FDI by multinational contractors (MCs).

The power of the OLI framework is increased on explaining and predicting FDI in contexts that exhibit extreme heterogeneity associated with extreme location specificity. Furthermore, the operationalisation of key theories representing the framework’s OLI factors is made far more precise.

Engineering, construction and architectural managers, can now more reliably apply the OLI framework both in MCs’ outbound FDI decisions and in governments’ decisions to attract new MCs – or inbound FDI.

A significant advance is made in the OLI framework in settings with extreme location specificity, along with the operationalisation of key theories associated with the OLI factors, including the first steps to operationalise Coase’s Nobel prize-winning transaction cost thesis.

March 18, 1966 Trade Dispute — Acts in furtherance of — Procuring breach of contract — Sub‐contract for “labour only” — Trade union objection in principle to “labour only” contracts — Industrial action to procure termination of sub‐contract continued after opportunity to learn terms on which sub‐contract terminable — Application by sub‐contractors for interim injunction — Whether industrial action prima facie unlawful interference with sub‐contract — Whether “labour only” contract “contract of employment”, Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (6 Edw. VII, c.47),s.3 — Trade Disputes Act, 1965 (c.48),s.1.

U.S. and E.U. public and defense procurement rules require large prime contractors to promote subcontracts to small businesses, a.k.a. small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Under the U.S. Small Business Act, large firms encourage subcontracting through publicity, subcontracting plans, and “good faith” efforts to achieve subcontracting goals. However, processoriented measures failed to guarantee definitive results. In contrast, E.U. and member governments can hold large firms accountable to stricter subcontracting standards (often sweetened by incentives). With the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, the U.S. is trying accountability measures now. Therefore, large contractors must plan for definitive subcontracting commitments in both markets.

The purpose of this paper is to outline a proposal for a Dual Scheme model of statutory adjudication for the Australian building and construction industry.

The paper deals with the security of payment problem in the Australian construction industry and the legislative response to that problem in New South Wales and elsewhere more generally. The paper highlights deficiencies in current adjudication schemes in Australia and proposes a revised methodology of adjudication by means of the proposed Dual Scheme model. The Dual Scheme is explained in detail and examples are given showing how the Dual Scheme would work in practice.

The Dual Scheme of adjudication allows for adjudication of “progress claims” (just as they are adjudicated now under the “Defined Scheme”), but also provides for separately adjudicated “money claims” in a similar way to that done under the “Non‐specific Scheme”. Both parties to a construction contract can take advantage of adjudication under a Non‐specific Scheme whilst simultaneously maintaining the relative time and cost benefits of the Defined Scheme in dealing with progress payment claims. Implementation of the proposed Dual Scheme would require new legislation.

The Dual Scheme is not a proposal to merely amalgamate two existing models of adjudication in Australia. Rather, it is a Dual Scheme incorporating the philosophy of two disparate systems of adjudication framed in a companionable form. It is hoped that the Dual Scheme may act as a common starting point for eventual agreement between the various interested groups as to what a national scheme of statutory adjudication in Australia will resemble in the future. The Dual Scheme proposal may be of interest in other jurisdictions where statutory adjudication for the construction industry has been introduced or is being contemplated.