Search results

In an industrial marketing context of manufacturer–distributor collaboration, this law and economics paper aims to contrast two approaches to contracting: conventional and strategic.

Based on relational rent theory, this paper provides an analytical framework for juxtaposing conventional and strategic contracting. A contingency approach is applied to formulate propositions as to when conventional versus strategic contracting is preferable.

The distinction between conventional and strategic contracting has implications as to whether relational governance substitutes or complements formal contracts (the substitution versus complements perspectives). Strategic contracting results in complementarity (rather than substitutability) between formal contracts and relational governance.

This paper argues that a more nuanced view on contract types, such as strategic versus conventional, may reconcile the enduring research controversy between the substitution and complements perspectives.

Today, formal contracts with foreign distributors tend to resemble “prenuptial agreements”. The opportunity for relational rent (e.g. manifested in higher export revenues) grows if conventional contracts are superseded by contracts following strategic contracting principles.

This study is interdisciplinary, not only by its combination of marketing, management and contractual economics but also through its law and economics amalgamation.

This paper aims to dissect cross-border contracting practices among exporting businesses. The under-representation of exporter-importer dynamics and the superficial understanding of contracts are the motivation for this exploratory study.

The qualitative multiple case study design focuses on 18 small to medium size enterprise (SMEs) exporting from New Zealand. The analysis encompasses coding, pattern matching and explanation building. This paper uses coding to uncover themes and pattern matching/cross-case comparison to facilitate explanation building.

The paper underlines the scant use of formal international sales/distribution contracts, the lack of knowledge concerning contracting, barriers to contract formation, misgivings about the court system and litigation and the adoption of proxy contracts. This paper depicts varieties of contracting practices, namely, no formal contract, improvisational, normative, and formal contractual arrangements and underlines the context in which each approach applies.

Similar to most studies in this area, the dissection of contracting practices derives from the exporter side of the dyad. This robs the research of a holistic view of the exchange. Nonetheless, this paper contributes to a better understanding of contract formation and formalization and to the role of context in shaping the activities of exporting SMEs.

Although formal contracts are vital, they are not obligatory in all exchanges. Contracts matter more for high intensity exporters with comparatively short relationship histories, selling knowledge-intensive products in predominantly non-relational cultures. Policymakers should highlight the importance of contracts in such contexts and direct SMEs to several freely available resources on cross-border contracting.

The research casts fairness/equity and access to justice as pertinent structural disadvantages impacting the contracting practices of exporting SMEs.

According to the authors’ knowledge, this paper is among the first studies to provide an in-depth portrayal of the contracting practices of exporting SMEs, to detail the pervasiveness of non-contractual contracting practices and to depict contracting as nuanced and context-dependent.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects that the framing of contractual performance incentives have on supplier’s behavioural and relational responses and on the buyer–supplier relationship.

The authors conducted three in-depth case studies of contractual relationships, which exhibit differences in terms of how performance incentives are framed, i.e., using promotion, prevention and “hybrid” frames, respectively. The study involved 38 semi-structured interviews and content analysis of contract agreements.

First, while promotion-framed incentives lead to positive supplier responses and improved relationships, prevention-framed incentives result in negative responses and deteriorating relations. Second, hybrid-framed incentives can lead to productive supplier responses when positive ex ante expectations are met, although the creation of such positive expectations in the first place depends on the proportionality of bonus and penalty elements. Third, promotion- and hybrid-framed incentives do not by default lead to positive effects, as these are contingent on factors pertaining to contractual clarity. Fourth, the overarching purpose of the contract moderates the effects of contract framing on supplier responses.

The study contributes to contracting research by showing how the framing of performance incentives influences supplier behavioural and relational responses. It also extends the existing literature on contract framing by examining the effects of hybrid-framed incentives, and stressing that contract framing should be considered in joint with the clarity and overall purpose of the contract to elicit desired supplier behaviours.

Managers of buying firms may differentiate their approach to contract framing depending on the type of supplier relationship in focus. Furthermore, effective design of promotion- and hybrid-framed incentives requires attention to: realistic performance targets (on the short, medium and long term); salient bonuses related to these targets; incentive structures that appropriately balance rewards and risks; and: mechanisms that explicate and consider uncontrollable factors in the calculation of bonus–malus payments.

The paper extends the literature stressing the psychological impact of contracts on buyer–supplier relationships by highlighting that contractual clarity and the overarching purpose of the contract moderate the effects of contract framing on supplier behavioural and relational responses.

Achieving the win–win goal in public–private partnership (PPP) has gained much research interest in recent times. These studies have addressed the achievement of win–win from various perspectives. An integration of the constructs from these various perspectives improves approach to attaining win–win throughout the entire project delivery. This study, therefore, becomes the first systematic review to analyse PPP studies towards identifying win–win constructs and then integrates findings into a conceptual model.

This study adopted a four-staged systematic review method. This includes concept development, papers retrieval, selection of relevant papers and qualitative analysis. Thematic analysis was used at the qualitative analysis stage for the identification and categorization of constructs and finally, systems thinking was adopted in integrating the findings into a conceptual mode

The achievement of win–win between government and private investors is of much desire hence a more conscious approach towards it is ideal. A total of 40 constructs were identified and were later categorised into six components. Some constructs identified include optimal assessment and fair allocation of project risks, reasonable concessions period, flexible contracting, equal and active participation and co-ordination of public and private actors and strategic negotiation.

This paper provides an improved definition of win–win scenario in PPP infrastructure project delivery. Furthermore, the novel approach of integrating win–win constructs into a systemic conceptual model is very relevant to PPP body of knowledge and practice. The study concludes with plausible research directions to further improve the achievement of win–win in PPP.

This study aims to investigate how contract design influences supplier performance. This study synthesises three theoretical views (efficiency, relational, contingency) and provides empirical support on how effective contract design improves supplier performance.

This study reviewed contract design literature and uncovered 18 factors that may impact supplier performance. Multi-criteria, decision-making analysis examined the impact of contract factors on three supplier groups: average-, over- and under-performers. Procurement experts working with a large multinational company dealing with hundreds of procuring contracts, yearly, provided their judgement on the impact of these factors on supplier performance. Semi-structured interviews with experts and other evidence were used for data and method triangulation.

Results show that contracting with under- and over- performers presents significant differences: in the case of over-performers, contracts have a dual, yet discrete, efficiency and relational role: at transaction level, they emphasise formality, protect from opportunism and include both liquidated damages and legal action clauses. At relational level, they focus on relational learning and incentivising suppliers. However, in the case of under-performers, contracts appear to focus on contingency factors, which can be a source of ambiguity, particularly in complex environments, and trust, which has a negative impact on supplier performance.

Improving contract design can help reduce partner opportunism, reduce inter-firm conflicts and avoid disputes that can bear a social cost. This study demonstrates that companies can use advanced analytical tools to reflect upon their own decision-making process of contact design in making transparent supplier performance assessments.

To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study using decision-making techniques to enhance supplier performance by improving the contract design process.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a theory‐based explanation for the emerging managerial role set within supply chain networks. As managing within supply networks requires a portfolio of capabilities, the emerging managerial role set is explained utilizing a combined knowledge‐based view and relational contracting theoretical perspective. The multiple foci of the manager’s role set within supply networks is associated with unique challenges that are also examined. Based on the analysis of these new challenges for supply chain managers, the managerial and research implications are outlined. In conclusion, specific managerial actions, which are necessary in supply chain networks to engender the development of trust and social capital in supply networks, are explained.

This paper aims to report on signs of public awareness and empowerment among the general public that are presumed to determine the viability of the smart contracting (SC) approach and identifies prevailing concerns regarding individual transactional experiences.

A mixed approach was followed to explore perceptions of self-regulation and transaction friendliness by using an interpretative multiple case study method and by presenting a descriptive summative analysis of the data.

On self-regulation, the study reveals spread awareness, empowerment, contractual competences and responsibility. Regarding transaction friendliness, subject matter influences transaction experiences the most, and trust and engagement are the most problematic factors. The findings support the viability of SC, endorsing the application of proactive perspectives in legal and managerial practice.

The study confirms the foundational assumptions of SC, identifies key transactional issues that should be further addressed to improve the functionality of digital trade environments and contributes to the consolidation of the legal design research field on transaction usability.

The findings point to the viability of SC. Organizations and practitioners are given indications on transaction upgrade priorities and invited to adopt and help disseminate the proposal.

The expansion of a collaborative transactional culture can reduce legal disputes, improving the legal environment of business and strengthening private governance regulatory models.

This is the first empirical study on the viability conditions of the SC-approach, identifying transactional usability testing and intervention priorities.

This paper aims to analyze the potentials of dynamic, commitment and revenue-sharing contracts; that a nonrebate offering manufacturer can use to safeguard his profit while his competitor offers customer rebates in a supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and a common retailer.

We consider a two-period supply chain model to explore optimal decisions under eight possible scenarios based on the contract and rebate offering decisions. Because the manufacturers are selling substitutable products, therefore, a customer rebate on one of the products negatively impacts the selling quantity of other. Optimal price, rebate, and quantities are examined and compared to explore the strategic choice for both the rebate offering and non-rebate offering manufacturer. Comparative evaluation is conducted to pinpoint how the parameters such as contract parameters and its nature affect the members.

The results demonstrate that all these contracts instigate the rebate offering manufacturer to provide a higher rebate, but do not ensure a higher profit. If the revenue sharing contract is offered to the common retailer, the effectiveness of the rebate program might reduce significantly, and the rebate offering manufacturer might receives lower profits. A non-rebate offering manufacturer might use a commitment contract to ensure higher profits for all the members and make sure the common retailer continues the product.

The effect of customer rebate vs. supply chain contract under competition has not yet been explored comprehensively. Therefore, the study contributes to the literature regarding interplay among pricing decision, contract choice and rebate promotion in a two-period setting. The conceptual and managerial insights contribute to a better understanding of strategic decision-making for both competing manufacturers under consumer rebates.

This study aims to empirically test the effects of key characteristics of performance-based contracting (PBC) (i.e. reward/payment scheme, increased supplier autonomy and transfer of responsibilities) on supplier goal commitment.

This study developed a conceptual model applying goal-setting theory (GST), expectancy theory (ET) and job characteristics theory (JCT). Survey data were collected and analyzed using structural equation modeling (SEM) to establish a validated measurement instrument for testing the hypotheses.

The findings revealed that PBC positively affects supplier goal commitment due to its unique characteristics, which translates into improved supplier performance. Furthermore, this study validated the mediating role of goal alignment and felt accountability operating between PBC characteristics and supplier goal commitment.

This study explored the buyer–supplier relationship from the supplier's standpoint. Using a more inclusive data set, future research may involve a dyadic analysis and focus on the effects of the following factors on the supplier goal commitment: relational aspects (e.g. trust and collaboration), the risk transfer from the buyer to the supplier, different incentive schemes and successful PBC implementation factors.

This study presents new, validated insights for contract selection, design and management. It underlines the importance of choosing the proper contract, having the appropriate contract design based on the desired outcomes and effective contract management by exhibiting the psychological/behavioral effect of fundamental PBC characteristics.

PBC represents an active research stream, but its psychological/behavioral implications are understudied. Therefore, this research puts forth a conceptual framework with multiple testable hypotheses illustrating the relationship between PBC and supplier goal commitment.

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are characterised by contracts which are necessarily incomplete due to the complexity of their contractual specifications for the contracted services combined with the long-term legal obligations they create. This creates high transaction costs including sharing (and so bearing) risks. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the link between risk sharing and governance, providing a new perspective for analysis with less emphasis on transaction costs and more on PPPs as strategic alliances.

Three main issues are analysed. First, the definition of PPP in terms of both the type of arrangements and the actors involved, structures varying from one country to another and between contracts. Second, the definition of strategic alliance, identifying which form(s) of PPP is a strategic partnership. Third, reconsideration of incomplete contract theory to identify the circumstances where a strategic alliance can accommodate high transaction costs.

The paper concludes that establishing PPPs as strategic alliances could rectify problems of incomplete contracts by implementing a multidimensional (rather than technocratic) approach to risk governance.

The contribution to knowledge provided by this study is rooted in the conceptualization of PPPs as strategic alliances by distinguishing the tangible characteristics of strategic alliance related to the letter of the contract from the intangible characteristics related to the spirit of the contract with the main purpose being to create both public and private value.