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Stakeholders are typically described as those who may affect or be affected by the actions of a firm. The purpose of this chapter is to present an argument that stakeholder theory should pay specific regard to what I term marginal stakeholders, that is, parties affected by a firm’s actions but who nevertheless have no actual or foreseeable influence to shape its strategic goals. Several key proponents of stakeholder theory maintain that these groups are not legitimate stakeholders and therefore do not warrant consideration. For example, marginal groups are routinely excluded from discussions of stakeholder fairness. Alternatively, theorists presume that advocates with leverage will protect these groups, or appeals to human rights will be sufficient. In contrast, I contend that there are cases where the firm has benefitted, but identifiable and discrete stakeholders have been negatively affected by corporate action in an environment where rights are ignored or there is no significant legal recourse. Drawing on foundational literature on fairness and insights from social psychology, I conclude that fully realized stakeholder theory means that a corporation has to consider its duties to all those affected by the impact of a firm, including the powerless.

One way of looking at the association between ethics and stakeholder theory – of examining the idea that stakeholder theory has a strong moral foundation – is to consider how the stakeholder approach might in fact be directly driven by and guided by the moral obligations of business. An alternative perspective we offer is that stakeholder theory only indirectly derives from the moral obligations of business, with business purpose serving as a mediating factor. We work through the fairly straightforward logic behind that alternative perspective in this chapter. We argue that it is a better way to think about the association between ethics and stakeholder theory, particularly because it allows for a theoretical and practical distinction between corporate social responsibility and stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory can thereby continue developing as a theory of strategic management, even as it brings morals to the fore in ways that other approaches to strategic management do not.

The relationship between stakeholders and organizations has been gaining more focus in strategic organizational management. The scenario of increased accountability required by society and by the competitive business environment itself demands ethical, fair, and sustainable practices from companies. In this sense, effective and fair stakeholder management becomes relevant. Thus, stakeholder theory proves to be a valid theoretical perspective for this challenge. In its conceptualization, stakeholder theory has pointed out different issues for strategic management practices, and how to treat the stakeholder fairly has been one of the concerns of the proponents of the theory (Bosse, Phillips, & Harrison, 2009). In this regard, principles of organizational justice have been incorporated into stakeholder management models. The authors argue that organizational justice, including its basic dimensions of distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice, can positively impact the bottom line of organizations through synergy in value creation and by encouraging reciprocal behavior between the firm and stakeholders.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a personal retrospective on six of the key events/experiences that influenced the development of the structure, foundational premises, and models of the resource‐advantage theory of competition.

The paper uses a personal retrospective approach.

The paper finds that six key events influenced the development of resource‐advantage theory: B.J. “Bud” LaLonde emphasizes the works of Alderson; Rob Morgan suggests an article on the resource‐based theory of the firm; Roy Howell suggests a presentation on R‐A theory; Randy Sparks shows a “socialist calculation” article; Kim Boal suggests the Journal of Management Inquiry as a publication outlet; and Bob Phillips discusses his work on “firm effects vs industry effects”. The paper then relates each of the six events to the paths, routes, or procedures that are often proposed as (or reported to be) likely to lead to the development of theories.

By providing the evolutionary history of resource‐advantage theory, the paper provides implications for developing marketing theories.

This chapter highlights some of the tensions and most promising points of convergence between the strategic management and stakeholder theory literatures. We briefly examine the early development of both areas, identifying some of the background assumptions and choices that informed how the fields evolved, and how these factors led the two fields to engage in scholarly pursuits that seldom intersected for a period of years, followed by a renewal of interest among strategists in themes that are central to stakeholder theory. From this discussion, we develop a larger agenda with specific topics as examples of areas that offer promise for integrative research that can advance knowledge in both fields. Our vision of the future is one in which the larger aspirations of scholars in strategy and stakeholder theory are more fully realized with human purposes, broadly defined, as the focal point.

In this chapter, we update stakeholder salience research using the new lens of stakeholder work: the purposive processes of organization aimed at being aware of, identifying, understanding, prioritizing, and engaging stakeholders. Specifically, we focus on stakeholder prioritization work — primarily as represented by the stakeholder salience model — and discuss contributions, shortcomings, and possibilities for this literature. We suggest that future research focus on stakeholder inclusivity, the complexity of prioritization work within intra-corporate markets, the integration of stakeholder prioritization with other forms of stakeholder work, and the development of managerial tools for multiobjective decision making within the strategic management context.

Stakeholder theory has been accused of being an umbrella concept rather than a distinct theory per se. Recognizing the stakeholder concept as an essentially contested concept subject to multiple competing interpretations, this chapter presents a systematic meta-level conceptual analysis. This chapter aims to contribute to the optimal development of stakeholder theory by clarifying the conceptual confusion surrounding its central construct to help prevent stakeholder theory from developing into an accumulation of disparate ideas. Multi-contextual contributions to stakeholder theory are analysed via an unparalleled bounded systematic review of 593 stakeholder definitions. Determinants of the stakeholder concept have been deconstructed and analysed to establish how definitional variables relate to variants of stakeholder theory. These determinants have been sorted, filtered and ordered to produce a comprehensive, multi-dimensional classification of stakeholder theory based on four hyponyms which relate to 16 definitional categories. The classification was then subjected to empirical testing with positive results. This evaluation of the stakeholder concept illustrates how contributions are aligned and interrelated, thereby prescribing what is acceptable (unacceptable) as inclusion within stakeholder theory. An invaluable overview of what we know about stakeholder theory is presented within a single model, drawing the conclusion that stakeholder theory is indeed a single theory.

This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.