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This paper is devoted to the question of what motivates man in his pursuit of economic activities. Particular attention is given to the notion that economic activities of individuals may not be motivated by their self‐interest alone.

Using literary analysis, the paper first reconsiders the role of self‐interest and non‐selfish motives in the historical schools. Then it is demonstrated that at least some non‐selfish motives were incorporated in the voluntary exchange theory of public economy. Next it is shown that during the evolution of the theory of public goods these non‐selfish motives were lost and that the modern theory of public goods rests entirely on the self‐interest hypothesis. However, over the last two decades results of public goods experiments have cast considerable doubt on the pure self‐interest hypothesis.

A major finding of this paper is that several non‐selfish motives of man that show up in recent public goods experiments were already discussed by representatives of the historical schools.

An agenda for future research on the topic is sketched in the final section.

Practical implications include that the allocation of many goods, not just public goods, may improve if agents pay more attention to non‐selfish motives of man.

The paper adds to the existing body of related writings by linking developments in the evolution of theory of public goods, in particular recent findings from public goods experiments, to a specific aspect already advocated by representatives of the historical schools, that is, the notion that man in his pursuit of economic activities is not motivated by his self‐interest alone. To this extent, the paper is of interest for researchers working on public goods theory, experimental economics and the history of economic thought.

In this paper, we investigate how digital technology disruptors and the incumbents who stand to be disrupted by them frame their arguments to transform or sustain existing institutional frameworks to enable or deter the market entry of these technologies. Using a longitudinal, comparative case analysis of three digital technologies – namely, voice over Internet protocol (VoIP), cloud antenna, and over-the-top (OTT) technologies – we explore how stakeholders use public interest frames for this purpose. We find that entrepreneurs use three specific frames to drive institutional change for the successful adoption of digital technologies in the presence of established incumbents and powerful regulators: frames that emphasize the broad public appeal of the new digital technology; frames that emphasize efficiency, democracy, and technological advancement; and frames that emphasize present as well as future benefits to the public. We find that constructing interpretations of what serves the public interest is the primary tactic used by disruptors to gain market entry, and an equally popular weapon for incumbents to block the entry of new digital technologies. These interpretations lead to a framing contest aimed at influencing regulators and obtaining a more favorable institutional environment. Our empirical findings illustrate that new digital technologies themselves are not the sole contributors to institutional change. Rather, institutional outcomes associated with the introduction of new digital technologies are shaped by how disruptors and incumbents use public interest frames and how regulators react to these frames.