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Mr E.H. Ernest Jones, who until recently has been Head of the Central Information Services, Shell International Petroleum Company Limited, gave a talk (summarized here) which was, he said, intentionally short, since O & M work was, he felt, something you do, rather than talk about! Lively discussion followed.

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which chief executive officers (CEOs) deserve the pay they receive both in terms of over and underpayment.

Rather than using the traditional normal distribution view in which CEO performance clusters around the mean with relatively little variance, the authors adopt a novel power law approach. They studied 22 industries and N = 4,158 CEO-firm combinations for analyses based on Tobin’s Q and N = 5,091 for analyses based on return on assets. Regarding compensation, they measured the CEO distribution based on total compensation and three components of CEO total pay: salary, bonus, and value of options exercised.

In total, 86 percent of CEO performance and 91 percent of CEO pay distributions fit a power law better than a normal distribution, indicating that a minority of CEOs are producing top value for their firms (i.e. CEO performance) and a minority of CEOs are appropriating top value for themselves (i.e. CEO pay). But, the authors also found little overlap between CEOs who are the top performers and CEOs who are the top earners.

The findings shed new light on CEO pay deservingness by using a novel conceptual and methodological lens that highlights systematic over and underpayment. Results suggest a violation of distributive justice and offer little support for agency theory’s efficient contracting hypothesis, which have important implications for agency theory, equity theory, justice theory, and agent risk sharing and agent risk bearing theories.

Results highlight erroneous practices when trying to benchmark CEO pay based on average levels of performance in an industry because the typical approach to CEO compensation based on averages significantly underpays stars and overpays average performers.

Results offer new insights on the extent of over and underpayment. The findings uncover an extremely large non-overlap between the top earning and top performing CEOs and to an extent far greater in magnitude than previously suggested.

Objetivo – El objetivo de nuestro estudio fue examinar si los directores ejecutivos (CEOs) merecen la remuneración monetaria que reciben.

Metodología – En lugar de utilizar el enfoque tradicional que asume que la distribución del rendimiento de CEOs sigue la curva normal (con la mayoría de CEOs agrupados en torno a la media y relativamente poca variación), adoptamos un enfoque diferente basado en la ley de potencia. Incluimos 22 industrias y N = 4.158 combinaciones de CEO-firma para análisis basados en Tobin’s Q y N = 5.091 para análisis basado en la rentabilidad de los activos. En cuanto a la remuneracion, medimos distribuciones basadas en la remuneración total y tres componentes del pago completo a los CEOs: salario, bonos, y el valor de las opciones ejercitadas.

Resultados – 86% de las distribuciones de rendimiento de CEOs y el 91% de las distribuciones de pago de los CEO se aproximan mejor a una distribución de ley de potencia que a una distribución normal. Esto indica que una minoría de los CEOs produce un valor muy superior para sus empresas (es decir, el rendimiento CEO) y una minoría de los CEOs apropia valor superior para sí mismos (es decir, pago de los CEO). Sin embargo, encontramos muy poco solapamiento entre aquellos CEOs que se desempeñan mejor y los CEOs que ganan más.

Implicaciones – Nuestros hallazgos usando una conceptualización y metodología novedosas ponen en relieve que a muchos CEOs se les paga demasiado y que a muchos no se les paga suficiente (en comparación con su desempeño). Los resultados sugieren una violación de los principios de justicia distributiva y no apoyan la hipótesis de “contratación eficiente,” y tienen implicaciones para para la teoría de la agencia, de la equidad, de la justicia, y de la distribución de riesgos.

Implicaciones prácticas – Los resultados destacan las prácticas erróneas con respecto a la distribución de compensación a CEOs que se basan en los niveles medios de rendimiento en una industria. Estas prácticas llevan a no pagar suficiente a los directivos “estrella” y pagar demasiado a los directivos con desempeño medio.

Originalidad/valor – Los resultados ofrecen nuevas perspectivas sobre la relación entre desempeño y compensación de CEOs y que los que se desempeñan mejor no son los que reciben más pago, y viceversa. Estas diferencias son mucho más grandes de que lo que se creía anteriormente.

Objetivo – O objetivo do nosso estudo foi examinar se os CEOs merecem a compensação monetária que recebem.

Metodologia – Em vez de utilizar a abordagem tradicional que assume que a distribuição do desempenho do CEO segue a curva normal (com a maioria dos CEOs agrupados em torno da média e relativamente pouca variação), adotamos uma abordagem diferente com base num enfoque inovador da lei de potência. Incluímos 22 indústrias e N = 4.158 combinações de CEO-empresa para análise baseada no Q de Tobin e N = 5091 para análise baseado na rentabilidade dos ativos. Em relação à compensação, medimos as distribuições de CEO com base no total de compensação e três componentes do pagamento total dos CEOs: salário, bônus e o valor das opções exercidas.

Resultados – 86% do desempenho do CEO e 91% das distribuições de pagamento do CEO correspondem a uma lei de potência melhor do que uma distribuição normal, indicando que uma minoria de CEOs está produzindo valor superior para suas empresas (ou seja, desempenho do CEO) e uma minoria de CEOs se apropriando do valor superior para si próprios (isto é, o salário do CEO). Mas, também encontramos pouca sobreposição entre CEOs que tem os melhores desempenhos e os CEOs que tem as maiores ganancias.

Implicações – Nossas descobertas lançam nova luz sobre o merecimento do pagamento do CEO, usando uma nova lente conceitual e metodológica que destaca o excessivo e o baixo pagamento sistemático. Os resultados sugerem uma violação da justiça distributiva e não apoiam a hipótese da contratação eficiente, e tem implicações para a teoria da agência, teoria da igualdade, teoria da justiça e distribuição de riscos.

Implicações práticas – Os resultados destacam práticas errôneas quando se tenta benchmark de remuneração do CEO baseado em níveis médios de desempenho em uma indústria, porque essas práticas levam a não pagar o suficiente aos CEOs “estrela” e pagar em excesso CEOs com desempenho médio.

Originalidade/valor – Os resultados oferecem novas perspectivas sobre a relação entre desempenho e retribuição dos CEOs e que os que desempenham melhor não são os que recebem um pagamento maior, e vice-versa. Estas diferenças são muito maiores do que se pensava anteriormente.

The overall goal of science is to build a valid and reliable body of knowledge about the functioning of the world and how applying that knowledge can change it. As personnel and human resources management researchers, we aim to contribute to the respective bodies of knowledge to provide both employers and employees with a workable foundation to help with those problems they are confronted with. However, what research on research has consistently demonstrated is that the scientific endeavor possesses existential issues including a substantial lack of (a) solid theory, (b) replicability, (c) reproducibility, (d) proper and generalizable samples, (e) sufficient quality control (i.e., peer review), (f) robust and trustworthy statistical results, (g) availability of research, and (h) sufficient practical implications. In this chapter, we first sing a song of sorrow regarding the current state of the social sciences in general and personnel and human resources management specifically. Then, we investigate potential grievances that might have led to it (i.e., questionable research practices, misplaced incentives), only to end with a verse of hope by outlining an avenue for betterment (i.e., open science and policy changes at multiple levels).

To review and address current approaches and limitations to modeling change over time in social entrepreneurship research.

The article provides a narrative review of different practices used to assess change over time. It also shows how different research questions require different methodologies for assessing changes over time. Finally, it presents worked examples for modeling these changes.

Our review suggests that there is a lack of research in social entrepreneurship that takes into account the many different considerations for addressing how time influences outcomes.

This chapter introduces an analytic technique to social entrepreneurship that effectively models changes in predictors and outcomes even when data are non-normal or nested across time or levels of analysis.

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This study empirically and theoretically aims to explore the consequences of top management’s dark personality traits (DPT) on organizational injustice, e.g. organizational procedural justice (OPJ), organizational interactional justice (OIJ) and organizational distributive justice (ODJ) and counterproductive work behavior (CWB).

A study was conducted to examine the influence of DPT on CWB among the contractual employees of the land revenue department, Pakistan. The quantitative method was employed using a convenient sampling approach. A designed survey questionnaire was distributed among 1,240 land revenue officials in 13 districts of Pakistan.

The results supported that dark DPT directly, significantly and positively affects CWB. In addition, DPT, except for psychopathy (PSY), significantly and negatively affects OPJ, OIJ and ODJ. Meanwhile, OIJ and OPJ strengthen the negative relationship between CWB and Machiavellianism and narcissism (NAR); however, PSY failed directly to affect OPJ, OIP and ODJ indirectly failed to capture CWB.

Top management/government should pay attention to fair dealings among the contractual employees. Consequently, they would prefer to do well in the workplace. Particularly, top management should avoid practicing DPT, which has ultimate results in CWB.

Public managers should avoid DPT because they are not compatible with public needs. Managers with DPT negatively affect their employees' productivity behaviors. Therefore, managers should focus on positive personality traits to enhance employees' productivity via organizational justice.

This study is unique in the land revenue department of Pakistan, where unfair dealings are being practiced among contractual employees. Surprisingly, CWB is the ultimate consequence of both DPT and top management's dishonest dealings (e.g. organizational injustices).

In the rapidly evolving digital economy, businesses face formidable pressures to maintain their competitive standing, prompting a surge of interest in the intersection of artificial intelligence (AI) and digital transformation (DT). This study aims to assess the impact of AI technologies on corporate DT by scrutinizing 3,602 firm-year observations listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The research delves into the extent to which investments in AI drive DT, while also investigating how this relationship varies based on firms' ownership structure.

To explore the influence of AI technologies on corporate DT, the research employs robust quantitative methodologies. Notably, the study employs multiple validation techniques, including two-stage least squares (2SLS), propensity score matching and an instrumental variable approach, to ensure the credibility of its primary findings.

The investigation provides clear evidence that AI technologies can accelerate the pace of corporate DT. Firms strategically investing in AI technologies experience faster DT enabled by the automation of operational processes and enhanced data-driven decision-making abilities conferred by AI. Our findings confirm that AI integration has a significant positive impact in propelling DT across the firms studied. Interestingly, the study uncovers a significant divergence in the impact of AI on DT, contingent upon firms' ownership structure. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) exhibit a lesser degree of DT following AI integration compared to privately owned non-SOEs.

This study contributes to the burgeoning literature at the nexus of AI and DT by offering empirical evidence of the nexus between AI technologies and corporate DT. The investigation’s examination of the nuanced relationship between AI implementation, ownership structure and DT outcomes provides novel insights into the implications of AI in the diverse business contexts. Moreover, the research underscores the policy significance of supporting SOEs in their DT endeavors to prevent their potential lag in the digital economy. Overall, this study accentuates the imperative for businesses to strategically embrace AI technologies as a means to bolster their competitive edge in the contemporary digital landscape.