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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an emerging field whose norms are still being written and rewritten. The concept of CSR as we know it today¹ started in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s and slowly spread to other developed countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The French for corporate social responsibility is Responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise (RSE), a nearly literal translation which however diverges to some extent from the original English. The concept is still unclear despite having been the subject of an increasing number of academic and professional papers, in management as well as in law journals. In the present study, we shall use the definition as set by the European Commission (2001), which defines it as ‘a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’. The European Commission in its Communication to the Parliament (2006) has stressed the fact that ‘it is about enterprises deciding to go beyond minimum legal requirements and obligations (our emphasis) stemming from collective agreements in order to address societal needs’. The second part of the definition is often omitted, but is at the crux of the problem of determining where CSR begins and ends. Corporate practices which involve ethical, social or environmental problems are defined as CSR practices only if companies go above and beyond their legal obligations. It should also be noted that the definition does not specify which guidelines to take into account in order to identify the standards to be applied in any given circumstances.

Transparency is assumed to improve markets' efficiency, to enhance better corporate governance and finally, to ensure moralisation of business life. The paper aims to the realities that prevailing discourses on transparency dissimulate.

First, a genealogical method is used to explore the theoretical roots, which underpin claims for a greater transparency (reduction of information asymmetry in academic discourses). Second, the analogies between mainstream theories on corporate governance (which legitimate the demand for transparency) and the Panopticon, the famous architecture conceived by Bentham are pinpointed. Finally, the reflections developed by philosophers such as Ricoeur and Henriot on ethics are exploited to explain why transparency is unable to produce the expected effects.

First, discourses on transparency often conceal reinsurance manœuvres and power struggles. Second, transparency appears as a modernised manifestation of panopticism: a common base (the concept of utility), the same fundamental assumption (the opportunistic nature of man) and a similar answer (discipline). More generally, panopticism and discourses on transparency are embedded in the same utilitarian philosophy which does not grant any space either for responsibility or for ethics and therefore, favours generalised amorality.

As a consequence it is suggested that one should explore the possibility of elaborating an economics theory, which would get rid of the concept of utility and a theory of the enterprise, which would take as key concepts creativity and trust, instead of opportunism.

Through the deconstruction of prevailing discourses on transparency, the paper points to the intrinsic anti‐humanistic character of mainstream economics and organisation theories and suggests alternative issues. It therefore may contribute to both enlightenment and emancipatory aims (in the Habermasian sense).

This paper aims to argue that the concept of “accountability” has changed and become perverted. Originally the concept meant answerability or the act of rendering an account. Those who were traditionally accountable were the powerful in organisations, public institutions and international bodies. The paper seeks point out that the notion of “accountability” has largely been emptied of its substance, as over the past few decades the concept of accountability has become perverted in discourse and in practice. The powerful are often no longer held accountable and are able to make those to whom they have hitherto been accountable, accountable to them instead.

The analysis is developed at the micro, meso and macro levels, through an analysis of the academic literature, in particular journals dealing with the interface between accounting and organisation studies.

It was found that what happens at the micro and meso levels becomes comprehensible when put into the context of the macro level. Instances of partial or reversed accountability in practice are pointed out and linked with insights from commentators in the fields of sociology and philosophy.

Concepts of accountability have become increasingly important in organisational discourse and practice over recent decades. This is particularly so given the importance now accorded to corporate governance and new public management. This paper is intended to formulate resistance to a particular discursive domination of corporate social responsibility. The paper is also new in the linking of this analysis with the argument that the weakening and reversal of accountability might be all‐pervasive in the current era of advanced capitalism and free market ideologies, and that the subversion of accountability is an instance of politically motivated hegemony.

Fulya Akyildiz is Assistant Professor, Department of Public Administration, Usak University, Turkey.