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Empirical studies show substantial variation across immigrants in the rate and direction of assimilation along various dimensions (e.g., cross-ethnic contact, language, identity). To explain this variation, past research has focused on identifying exogenous factors, such as discrimination, human capital, and settlement intention. In this chapter we argue that variation in immigrant outcomes emerges endogenously through positive interaction effects between dimensions of assimilation. We propose a new assimilation model in which processes of social influence and selection into congruent social environments give rise to multiple long-term equilibria. In this model, migrants who are already assimilated along many dimensions tend to also adapt along other dimensions, while less assimilated migrants become more strongly embedded in their ethnic group.

To test the assimilation model, we derive a number of hypotheses, which we evaluate using trend analysis and dynamic panel regression on data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada.

The data mostly confirm the hypotheses, providing overall support for the assimilation model.

Our theory and findings suggest that immigrants would follow divergent assimilation trajectories even in the absence of a priori population heterogeneity in external factors.

The positive interaction effects between cultural and structural dimensions of assimilation suggest that mixed policies that promote integration while seeking to prevent loss of identity go against the natural tendency for cultural and structural assimilation to go hand in hand.

The present chapter proposes a novel model of immigrant assimilation and an empirical test.

Diffusion studies investigate the propagation of behavior, attitudes, or beliefs across a networked population. Some behavior is binary, e.g., whether or not to install solar panels, while other behavior is continuous, e.g., wastefulness with plastic. Similarly, attitudes and beliefs often allow nuance, but can become practically binary in polarized environments. We argue that this property of behavior and attitudes – whether they are binary or continuous – should critically affect whether a population becomes homogenous in its adoption of that behavior. Models show that only continuous behavior converges across a network. Specifically, binary behavior allows local convergence, as multiple states can be local majorities. Continuous behavior becomes uniform across the network through a logic of communicating vessels. We present a model comparing the diffusion of both types of behavior and report on a laboratory experiment that tests it. In the model, actors have to distribute an investment over two options, while a majority receives information that points to the optimal option and a minority receives misguided information that points toward the other option. We predict that when adjacent persons receive misguided information this can hinder convergence toward optimal investment behavior in small networked groups, especially when subjects cannot split their investment, i.e., binary choice. Results falsify our theoretical predictions: Although investment decisions are significantly negatively affected by local majorities only in the binary condition, this difference with the continuous condition is not itself significant. Binary and continuous behavior therefore achieve comparable incidences of optimal investment in the experiment. The failure of the theoretical predictions appears due to a substantial level of error in decision-making, which prevents local majorities from locking in on a suboptimal behavior.

Individual rationality sometimes leads to collectively irrational outcomes, a fundamental problem in the social and life sciences that has attracted sustained attention from experimentalists in sociology, psychology, biology, and economics. But what is it about individual rationality that sometimes gets us into trouble? Is the problem the egoistic pursuit of individual self-interest? Or does the problem with individual rationality lie elsewhere? To find an answer, this chapter closely examines the theoretical and experimental literature on social dilemmas, to see how researchers identify the source of the problem. The review suggests that the prevailing theory wrongly points to egoism as the problem. Failing to do what is best for everyone can also happen among rational altruists, and sometimes egoism is needed to prevent it. The chapter concludes by pointing to what we believe is the fundamental problem – a tension not between individual self-interest and collective welfare, but between individual autonomy and collective interdependence.

Advances in Group Processes publishes theoretical analyses, reviews, and theory-based empirical chapters on group phenomena. The series adopts a broad conception of “group processes.” This includes work on groups ranging from the very small to the very large, and on classic and contemporary topics such as status, power, exchange, justice, influence, decision-making, intergroup relations, and social networks. Previous contributors have included scholars from diverse fields including sociology, psychology, political science, philosophy, computer science, mathematics, and organizational behavior.